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Drifting into Dangerous Waters: 
The Separation of Aesthetic Experience from  
the Work of Art
M o d ern iza tio n , ru n s  a fam iliar story, is typified by the  increasing  d iffe­
ren tia tio n  o f  value spheres, each with its own im m anen t logic an d  relative 
autonom y. Initially expressed  in philosophical terms by Kant, whose th ree 
critiques neatly divide the m ental world in to  cognitive, ethical and  aesthetic 
realm s, the process was given sociological g round ing  in the writings o f Max 
W eber, who exp lo red  the institutional underp inn ings of the differentiation 
based on specialization o f function  and  the creation o f separate cultures o f 
expertise . In his m ore  re cen t defense o f the project o f m odernity, Jü rg en  
H aberm as has soberly appraised  the benefits and costs o f  the splits am ong 
th e  sp h eres as well as betw een them  and  an allegedly p rio r lifeworld o f  
unreflective practices o u t o f  which the spheres em erged. In the tradition  
b road ly  circum scribed  by these th ree  nam es, the d ifferen tiation  o f value 
spheres is by an d  large acknow ledged as a progressive o r a t least irreversible 
process, w hich has allowed the  clarification o f theoretical issues and  the 
increased  efficiency th a t o ften  accom panies a division o f labor. W hile what 
H aberm as has called the troub ling  »colonization« o f one  realm  by an o th er 
may be problem atic, the solution has been the restoration o f a balance ra ther 
th an  an  overcom ing  o f the distinctions themselves.
A gainst such a read ing , a form idable array o f critics has bem oaned the 
loss o f  the allegedly in teg ra ted  world tha t p receded  the split in to  distinct 
an d  incom m ensurab le  value spheres. M obilizing the now familiar rhetoric  
o f  dissociation o f  sensibility, alienation o r d irem ption , these critics yearn to 
ded ifferen tia te , o r a t least re n d e r  m ore perm eable the boundaries between 
the  spheres. T hey have so u g h t ways to restore a cond ition  o f reconciliation 
o r h arm o n y  th a t they believe once existed o r at least posit it as a norm ative 
goal fo r a fu tu re  in w hich the  putative wounds o f m o d ern  life w ould be 
healed . W hat has becom e tran scen d en t and  abstract, they hope to restore 
to im m an en t concreteness, and  perhaps in so doing reen ch an t a world from 
w hich m ean in g  seem s to have fled o r re treated  into isolated enclaves. Even 
those critics norm ally  p laced  in the postm odern ist cam p, who dismiss such 
a quest as little m ore th an  nostalgia for an  im aginary prelapsarian  bliss that 
never o b ta in ed  an d  never will, are no less hostile to the alleged autonom y
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and  self-sufficiency o f the th ree value spheres, w hose b o u n d arie s  an d  limits 
they eagerly transgress o r ra th e r claim  are always already self-transgressed.
In what follows, I do  n o t want to add  an o th e r ro u n d  to this now  fam iliar 
debate, w hich has taken m any d iffe ren t form s an d  a t tim es spilled o u t over 
the walls o f the academ y to inspire fervent m ovem ents o f cu ltu ra l, religious 
and political renewal. Instead, I want to h o n e  in on  one  co rn er o f  it, in which 
a d ifferentiation within a d ifferen tiation  has taken place. T h a t is, I w ant to 
exam ine the consequences within the  aesthe tic  sp h e re  o f  the  d istinc tion  
between works o r objects o f  art and  w hat has com e to  be  called »aesthetic 
experience.« I will have to ask your in d u lg en ce  fo r n o t a ttem p tin g  a serious 
analysis o f  w hat m ight co u n t as an ob ject o r work o f  art, itself a d istinc tion  
that can n o t be entirely  ignored. I simply d o n ’t have the tim e to reh earse  
the debates generated  by Nelson G oodm an’s path-breaking  Languages o f Art 
with its opposition  o f »autographic« an d  »allographic« works, the  fo rm er 
u n d ers to o d  as singu lar, m ateria l ob jects, like p a in tin g s , w ith claim s to 
authenticity  based on  their p ro d u c tio n  history, the  la tte r as ideal objects, 
like musical com positions o r works o f lite ra tu re , with the ability to g en e ra te  
an infinity o f valid instantiations.1 N or will I be able to consider the fu r th e r 
refinem ent between im m anent and tran scen d en t works recently in tro d u ced  
by G érard G enette , the fo rm er im plying identity  betw een the  w ork an d  its 
m aterial instantiation (or, if allographic, instan tia tions), the latter suggesting 
the ways in  which works can exceed those instan tia tions an d  p ro d u ce  p lu ral 
aesthetic effects.2 1 will simply take as given the  heuristic  usefulness o f  the 
distinction between art object, however it may be defined, and  the experience 
it generates. In so doing, I h ope  to provide som e insight in to  the  dangers 
involved w hen e ither the d ifferentiations o f m odern ity  becom e too firm ly 
re if ied  o r  conversely  w hen  th e  d e s ire  to  o v e rco m e  th em  re su lts  in  a 
problem atic confusion o r conflation o f  categories, lead ing  to th a t d rift in to  
dangerous waters suggested by my title.
A lthough an awareness o f the specificity o f a varian t o f ex perience th a t 
m ight be called aesthetic has been  d iscerned  as far back as Pythagoras, it 
was perhaps n o t un til the 19th century  th a t the  cen te r o f  gravity in  aesthetic  
discourse decisively shifted from  the  idea  o f beau ty  assum ed to  reside in 
objects in the  world to the experiences o f the  hum ans who re sp o n d ed  to 
them . T he shift was evidenced, inter alia, by the  ascendency o f psychological 
accounts o f that experience in the scientific work o f Gustav F echner and  others
1 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis, 
1968).
2 Gérard Genette, The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence, trans. G.M. Goshgarian 
(Ithaca, 1997).
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in  the 1860's and  the general cult of experience in the so-called »philosophies 
o f life« la ter in the century, in  which intensity o f experience (in the sense o f 
vital Erlebnis, ra th e r th an  cognitive o r dialectical Erfahrung) was the highest 
value.3 T h e  g ro u n d , however, was already laid in the 18th century with the 
d ev e lo p m en t o f a d istinc t b ran ch  o f philosophical discourse focusing on 
»art,«  a g e n e ric  ca teg o ry  u n d e r  w hich all o f  the sep a ra te  M uses w ere 
subsum ed .4 T h a t discourse, it is often no ted, em erged at a time when objects 
th a t h ad  previously b een  revered  as sacred and  played a role in religious 
w orship o r were ap p rec ia ted  as em blem s o f social o r political power were 
red escrib ed  an d  newly leg itim ated  as works possessing purely artistic value. 
As H egel was am ong  the  first to p o in t o u t in his Lectures on Aesthetics, the 
cadavers o f dead  cults could  be revived through redescription as living works 
o f art. N o lon g er expected  to im itate an ideal world, illustrate a mythic story, 
o r recrea te  a historical event, they could be justified in  self-referential terms 
privileging form  over c o n ten t o r  function. T he recontextualization  o f such 
ob jects in  the  h e te ro to p ic , a tem p o ra l space o f the public  m useum , the 
classical exam ple being the transform ation o f the palace o f the Louvre during 
the F rench  Revolution in to  a repository of the n a tio n ’s cultural patrim ony, 
accom panied and  abetted  the new discourse, which also em erged in the wake 
o f an  accelera ted  m arket for objects o f beauty by private collectors outside 
o f  th e  aristocracy  o r ch u rch . C oncom itan t with the change was the new 
distinction betw een a fine artist and merely skilled artisan, neatly symbolized 
by the decision to exclude engravers from the newly created  Royal Academy 
o f  the Arts in  L o n d o n  in 1768.
T hese aspects o f  the story have been  widely rem arked. W hat is perhaps 
less freq u en tly  realized  is th a t a t virtually the sam e m o m en t th a t freshly 
red efin ed  artworks were being  freed  from  their en tang lem en t in religious, 
political o r u tilita rian  contex ts, allowed to circulate in a new netw ork o f 
value, a t once cu ltu ra l an d  econom ic, and  housed  in  secular tem ples of 
cu ltu re  o p en  to the  peop le, they were paradoxically losing their integrity as 
self-sufficient en tities in the world, definable in intrinsic terms as objective 
exem plars o f universal beauty. In the vocabulary m ade familiar by W alter 
B enjam in, this loss m ean t the progressive dissipation o f the cultic au ra  that
3 See the discussion in Wîadyslaw Tatarkiewicz, »Aesthetic Experience: The Early History 
of the Concept,« Dialectics and Humanism, 1 (1973); and »Aesthetic Experience: the Last 
Stages in the History of a Concept,« Dialectics and Humanism, 1 (1974). The importance 
of the »philosophy of life« is argued in Richard Shusterman, »The End of Aesthetic 
Experience,« Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55,1 (1997), p. 29.
4 For a recent discussion of the problematic implications of that generic subsumption, 
seeJean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Ca., 1996).
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su rro u n d ed  such entities, an aura  p red ica ted  on  the p resen ce  o f a u n iq u e  
o b jec t th a t  was d is tan t an d  d is tin c t fro m  th e  b e h o ld e r . A lth o u g h  it is 
undeniable that some of the num inous atm osphere clinging to sacred objects 
was transferred  to certain  fetishized works o f  elite art, w hose cu ltu ra l capital 
was accordingly high, the philosophical leg itim ation  o f  th a t transfer tacitly 
abandoned  the claim  tha t such objects possessed an  aesthetic  version o f  the 
religious no tion  o f »real presence,« an  in carn atio n  o f u ltim ate  value th a t 
was prior to the b eh o ld er’s response to it. In a con tex t o f  increased  openness 
to cultural difference, which m irro red  the  uneven , b u t w iden ing  to lera tion  
o f religious pluralism  an d  apprecia tion  o f geograph ical diversity, absolu te 
and  universal h ierarchies of beauty  w ere h a rd e r  to m ain tain . T h e  classical 
standards o f  a Boileau, confidently g ro u n d e d  in  an  objectivist b e lie f in  the 
o rder o f  na tu re , were challenged by th e  »sentim entalism « o f  a D ubos, who 
focused instead on the feelings of those who re sp o n d ed  to specific w orks.5 
Increasingly, in fact, 18th-century aesthetic  theory  sh ifted  a tten tio n  to  the 
experience o f  that beholder or the com m unity o f beholders. As David H um e 
famously p u t it in his essay »O f the S tandard  o f Taste,« »beauty is n o  quality 
in the things themselves: It exists m erely in  the  m ind  w hich con tem plates 
them ; an d  each m ind perceives a d iffe ren t beauty.«5
T he G reek aiesthesis, the o rig in  o f  the  Latin  w ord  Aesthetica u sed  by 
A lexander B aum garten for his two-volume w ork o f 1750 an d  1758, im plied  
gratifying corporeal perception , the subjective sensual response  to objects 
ra ther than  objects themselves. O ne o f its an tithetical term s was noesis, w hich 
signified p u re  conceptual tho u g h t separa ted  from  the senses. A n o th er was 
poiesis, the active m aking of objects artistic o r otherwise. Som e o f tha t activism 
may have been  re ta ined  in the ancillary no tion  o f taste, with its co n n o ta tio n
5 For a still useful account of the transition, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy o f the 
Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln andjames P. Pettegrove (Boston, 1955), chapter 
7.
6 David Hume, »Of the Standard of Taste,« in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. 
Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 230. Later in the essay, Hume does retreat 
from the anarchic implications of this statement and asserts the likelihood that »the 
principles of taste [are] nearly, if not entirely the same in all men,« (p. 241), but adds 
that few are educated to realize what they are. Here in a nutshell, we have the perennial 
problem of reconciling Hume’s skeptical side with his naturalist one. For a good short 
account of his thoughts on aesthetics, see Peterjones, »Hume’s Literary and Aesthetic 
Theory,« in David Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge, 
1992). He underscores the importance of social context and conventions in Hume’s 
account of judgment. For a defense of his position against Kant’s, see George Dickie, 
The Century of Taste: The Philosophical Odyssey o f Taste in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 
1996).
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o f  ta c t i le  in te rv e n tio n  in  th e  w o rld ,7 w h ich  im p lie d  e x p e r ie n c e  as 
ex p e rim en ta tio n . B ut even h ere  the em phasis was on the  em otional, even 
irra tio n a l recep tio n  o f a r t epitom ized by the »je ne sais quoi« attitude of 
ineffability th a t becam e em blem atic o f the re trea t from  conceptualization 
a n d  p ro d u c tio n . As J o h n  Dewey was la te r to no te  w ith chagrin , the very 
co n cep t o f  th e  »aesthetic,« w hen set ap a rt from  the overlapping, b u t n o t 
eq u iv a len t te rm  »artistic,« tends to re n d e r  ex p erien ce  as »appreciative, 
perceiving and  enjoying,«8 ra th e r than productive or creative. A lthough the 
d iscourse co n cern in g  aesthetic  ju d g m en t tha t cu lm inated  in K ant’s third 
Critique w en t beyond  the  passive and  conventionalist subjectivism o f taste 
re p resen te d  by H um e and  sough t m ore universal criteria, it too focused on 
the  response ra th e r  th an  the  object per se. Kant did, to be  sure, provide an 
ac co u n t o f the  genius who created  w ithout criteria -  a productive correlate 
o f  the  b eh o ld e r, who, as we will see, judges w ithout them  as well -  the m ain 
em phasis o f his aesthetics was on  recep tion .1'
T his is n o t the place to trace the com plex ways in which the concep t of 
aesth e tic  ex p e rien ce  was developed  by such E n lig h ten m en t theorists as 
B a u m g a rte n , S h aftesb u ry , H u tch e so n , H u m e, Kames an d  K ant, o r  to 
u n tan g le  the  web o f m eanings su rround ing  the crucial term  »taste,« b u t a 
few cen tra l po in ts n eed  to be m ade.1'1 First, w hether the g round  o f aesthetic 
ex perience was assum ed to be an innate capacity, an unm ediated , non-rule- 
b o u n d  sense o f w hat was beautiful com parable to an inbred  m oral sentim ent, 
as it was fo r the neo-P latonist Shaftesbury, or understood  instead to derive 
from  p ure ly  em pirica l en co u n te rs  with the world, as the m ore skeptical 
H um e believed, it was irreducible to a m ere recording o f what was intrinsically 
there in objects deem ed  artistic or beautiful. The same conclusion was shared
7 For a discussion of the origins of taste in these terms, see Howard Caygill, Ait of Judgment 
(Oxford 1989), chapter 2.
8 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1934), p. 47.
9 It is true that what Kant called »productive imagination« plays a role in aesthetic 
appreciation, as it does in normal cognition, albeit under the guidance of the 
understanding. But what was produced was a mental synthesis, not an active 
intervention in the world. For a discussion of its importance, see Michael R. Neville, 
»Kant’s Characterization of Aesthetic Experience,« Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, 
33, 2 (Winter, 1974), p. 197.
10 For useful accounts, see Dabney Townsend, »From Shaftesbury to Kant: The 
Development of the Concept of Aesthetic Experience,« Journal of the History of Ideas, 
48/2 (April-June, 1987), pp. 287-305; and Hans Robert Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and 
Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, 1982). For a more general 
history, foregrounding the questionable political implications of aesthetic discourse, 
see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford, 1990).
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by those who saw the source o f the aesthetic  sense in personal psychology, 
com m unal, intersubjective consensus, o r the m ore philosophically g ro u n d ed  
»reflective judgm ent«  tha t had  been  posited  by K ant as a way to g e t beyond 
the apparen t antinom y of taste, at once personal an d  universal. In all o f these 
cases, the stress was on  the one o r ones who d id  the  ex p e rien c in g  ra th e r  
th an  on the  in trinsic qualities o f th e  o b jec t th a t was ex p e rien ced . »T he 
b eau tifu l,«  as K ant w ould  a rg u e , a p p e a re d  on ly  as th e  p re d ic a te  o f  a 
ju d g m en t, n o t as a quality o f an object. In  som e ways rem in iscen t o f  the 
epistem ological limits on knowing objects in  them selves, w h e th e r co u ch ed  
in  the E m piricist vocabulary o f lack ing  access to p rim ary  as o p p o sed  to 
secondary qualities o r the transcenden  tal Idealist vocabulary o f unknow able 
noum ena, the object as such was less im portan t than  its aesthetic appreciation  
o r enjoym ent. H ere  too a kind o f »C opern ican  revo lu tio n ,« 11 to  cite the  
famous m etap h o r identified  with K ant’s first Critique, took place in  w hich 
ontological o r axiological questions were su b o rd in a ted  to those co n cern in g  
the epistem ological or, in this case, aesthetic subject. O bjects w ere ad m ired  
n o t for w hat they were in themselves, b u t fo r w hat they cou ld  do  to us. T h e  
telos o f this C opernican reversal was an  increasing ind ifference to the  ob ject 
as such, perhaps even ex tend ing  to its very existence.
Before th a t en d p o in t was reached , an d  this is the second  p o in t w orth  
em phasiz ing , the sensual p leasu re  p ro d u c e d  by th e  o b jec t in  a e s th e tic  
experience had  to be d istinguished from  th a t en joyed  in  o th e r  re la tions 
between self and world. As early as Jo h an n e s  Scotus E rig en a’s 9 th-century  
»De divisione naturae,«  the spectatorial, n o n -in stru m en ta l n a tu re  o f the 
aesthetic attitude had  a ttracted  a tten tio n .12 A lthough o n e  m igh t also covet 
the same objects for what a later age would call their com m odity o r exchange 
value, they were appreciated  qua objects o f  a rt only from  a m ore lofty p o in t 
o f view. R ejecting the egocentric an th ropo logy  o f  a H obbes, Shaftesbury 
stressed the fallacy o f reducing  everything to the question  o f  private in tere st 
o r need. Instead, and  this was re la ted  to his b e lie f th a t aesthetic  ex p erien ce  
was in te rtw in ed  w ith civic v irtue an d  m o ra l se n tim e n t, » d is in te rested «  
benevolence was its crucial characteristic .13
11 Whether or not the metaphor, which in this precise form did not appear in Kant, 
adequately describes the innovations of the Critique of Pure Reason need not concern 
us now. For a skeptical account of its applicability, see Robert Hahn, K ant’s Newtonian 
Revolution in Philosophy (Carbondale, 1988).
12 See the discussion in Tatarkiewicz, »Aesthetic Experience: The Early History of the 
Concept,« p. 23. Jauss points to other examples of medieval anticipations of aesthetic 
experience, which produce anxiety because they are linked with idle curiosity about
the world rather than immersion in the word of God. See Aesthetic Experience and Literary 
Hermeneutics, p. 4.
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I t  was, o f  c o u rse , in  K a n t’s ae s th e tic  th eo ry  th a t th e  c o n c e p t o f 
d is in te re s ted n e ss  was fully articu la ted . In  the  Critique o f Judgment, K ant 
claim ed th a t o u r ability to experience pleasure took th ree  forms. T he first 
h e  ca lled  the  »agreeable« o r »the pleasant« (das Angenehme), w hich was 
cau sed  d irec tly  by sensual s tim ulation . It involved a pu re ly  private an d  
subjective re sp o n se  o f a ttra c tio n  an d  aversion, w ithou t any m ean ing fu l 
cognitive o r intersubjective dim ension. H ere the individual body with all its 
appetites  an d  an tipath ies was the arbiter, n o t a cultural o r  universal norm . 
P ersona l g ra tifica tion  o r lack th e re o f was all th a t m atte red . T he second  
variety co n n ec ted  pleasure to the question o f the »good.« T h at is, we can 
derive »delight in the good« (das Wohlgefallen am Guten) th rough  working 
fo r a n d  ach ieving a b en e ficen t goal, which is set by ideas and  princip les 
ex terna l to sensual gratification. In this case there  is always a functional o r 
u tilitarian  d im ension  to o u r pleasure, which is n o t an en d  in itself. T he real 
en d  is the good  th a t is realized , n o t the p leasure we have in realizing it, 
a lth o u g h  th a t p leasure may be a subsidiary p art o f o u r m otivation as well.
T h e  th ird  form  o f p leasure (das Wohlgefallen am Schönen), K ant argued, 
is w hat we can p roperly  call aesthetic. As in the case o f the »agreeable,« the 
senses play a ro le  an d  the body is involved, b u t with a crucial difference. 
W hereas in  the  fo rm er the  ob ject tha t produces the p leasure m ust actually 
exist -  we can n o t find  a m eal p leasant unless there  is real food on  the table
-  in the latter, it m ay not. O r m ore precisely, o u r perception o f the aesthetic 
object, an d  its in trinsic  p roperties  or qualities need  n o t coincide, as they 
m ust with an  agreeable m eal (food may look appetizing, b u t it m ust taste 
good  to  b rin g  us g en u in e  p leasure). Because o f this distinction, we have no 
d irec t in te re st in the object, only in its rep resen ta tion  o r sem blance. O r to 
be still m ore precise, since the m edia o f representations can themselves be 
u n d ers to o d  as objects (a gold statue is, after all, m ade of a substance whose 
value we fin d  d ifficu lt to fo rg e t), w hat is im p o rtan t is a ce rta in  k ind  o f 
ex p erien ce  o f  it. O u r p leasure in beauty, in short, is d isin terested  because 
we are in d iffe ren t to the  actual object, which is n o t itself an  object of d irec t 
sen su a l desire . W e are  n o  lo n g e r im m ersed  in being  -  inter-esse, as the  
etym ology o f the w ord »interest« suggests -  bu t ra ther som ehow  outside it. 
We enjoy an aesthetic m eal, as it were, w ithout having to taste and  swallow 
the food, as in the case o f  certain  variants o f nouvelle cuisine in which visual 
m ore th an  gustatory  p leasure, le t alone actual nu trition , seems the m ain 
p u rpose  o f  w hat is on  the plate. It is the same disinterestedness tha t perm its
13 For a history of the concept, see Jerome Stolnitz, »On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic 




the transform ation of the lust-arousing naked  h um an  form  in to  the idealized, 
m arm oreal nude and allows us to distinguish betw een po rnography  an d  high 
a r t  (b o th  o f  w hich  m ay b e  r e p re s e n ta t io n s  o f  re a l  o b je c ts , b u t  a re  
d ifferen tiated  according to o u r in terest o r  d isin terest in th e ir  re feren ts  as 
objects o f desire).
A esthe tic  ex p e rien ce  is, how ever, also ak in  to  th e  sec o n d  fo rm  o f  
pleasure in its going beyond pre-conceptual sensual gratification o r rem ain ing  
on  the level of w hat K ant dismissively called  th e  m ere  »egoism  o f taste.« 
A esthetic experience mobilizes cognitive powers, synthesizing transfo rm a­
tions o f p u re  sensation evolve into tru th  o r a t least value claims, w hich are 
th en  assum ed to have universal validity. B ut it does so w ithou t subsum ing  
specific cases u n d er discursive rules, a priori categories o r  general principles, 
as is the case with the determ inantjudgm ents o f the understanding. T he latter 
seem  to com e from  above, as if th ro u g h  the  coercive d ictates o f  a ru ler. In  
contrast, aesthetic judgm ents, singular ra th e r th an  categorical, are allowed 
a k ind  o f unhierarch ical, free play in w hich universal claims o f beau ty  can  
be m ade by each o f us on the basis o f  analogical an d  parad igm atic  ra th e r  
th an  subsum ptive o r deductive reaso n in g . We m ove from  p a r tic u la r  to  
p articu lar ra th e r than  from  universal to particu lar, as was the  case w ith the 
synthetic a p riori ju d g m en ts o f cognition  discussed in the first Critique. T h e  
co n c ep ts  involved are  thus » in d e te rm in a te «  b e c a u se  th ey  c a n n o t  b e  
e x p re s se d  in  sc h e m a tic  fo rm , as can  th e  co g n itiv e  c o n c e p ts  o f  th e  
understand ing . They appeal to a virtual sensus communis, an  in tersubjective 
com m unity which is to be m ade, n o t sim ply found , as innatist neo-Platonists 
like Shaftesbury had  th ough t possible. A crucial aspect o f d isin terestedness 
for Kant -  although not, as we shall see, for the devotees o f  l ’art pour l ’art — 
was precisely this assum ption that aesthetic ju d g m en ts  evoked an  en joym ent 
and  appreciation  that was n o t ju s t o n e ’s own, b u t th a t cou ld  be sh ared  by 
all. To the  ex ten t that ju d g m en t was an  in h e re n t d im ension  o f  aesthe tic  
experience, and n o t som ething ad d ed  to  it after the initial response  o f  the  
senses, disinterestedness had  this crucial com m unicative im plication, w hich 
was lacking in expressions o f idiosyncratic taste.
W hat also distinguishes aesthetic experience , K ant argued , from  the  
deligh t in the good, w here practical ou tcom es are  sought, is the  in trinsic  
n a tu re  o f  the purposes involved, w hich are akin to the  im m an en t telos o f 
play ra th e r than  work, whose end  is a transfo rm ation  o f the  w orld. K an t’s 
celebrated definition of art as »purposiveness w ithout purpose« was designed 
precisely to  set it ap art from  those activities in  w hich ex trinsic  pu rp o ses  
dom inate  and  real objects are there  to be p ro d u ced , consum ed , possessed 
o r exchanged.
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W h eth e r o r n o t the  d istinction  betw een d e te rm in an t and  reflective 
ju d g m en ts  really solves the ridd le of the antinom y of taste, at once subjective 
an d  objective, o r provides a useful m odel for intersubjective consensus rather 
th an  m erely an  ideological sim ulacrum  o f one, are n o t questions I want to 
address now. N o r do I w ant to rehearse  the debate  over w hether or no t 
aesth e tic  ju d g m e n t an d  ex p erien ce  are based on  a  purely  psychological 
concep t o f the beho ld ing  self o r a m ore logically generated  one, com parable 
in  som e ways to the transcenden ta l, synthesizing self in troduced  in the first 
Critique to provide a fo u n d a tio n  for epistemology. I am  equally re luctan t to 
take sides in  the a rg u m e n t over the ex ten t to which K ant’s position can be 
red u ced  to n o th in g  b u t a defense o f an  aesthetic a ttitude or m ental state, 
w hich has exercised com m entato rs like Jerom e Stolnitz, George Dickie and 
M ary McKlosky.14
W h a t I w an t to  d o  in s te a d  is focus on  th e  im p lica tio n s  o f d is in ­
terestedness fo r the a r t object, which m ust be d istinguished from  objects in 
general, and  the  larger question  of the d ifferentiation o f value spheres in 
m odern ity . For a lth o u g h  aesthetic judgm en ts are norm ally m ade by means 
o f a rh e to ric  o f objectivity -  »‘T he M ona Lisa’ is a beautiful painting,« no t 
»I  think it is a beau tifu l painting« -  Kant stresses that it is the subject who is 
really  th e  so u rce  o f  th e  ju d g m e n t. Objectivity, as o n e  o f K an t’s recen t 
in te rp re te rs  Eva S chaper has po in ted  out, is m erely an  »as-if« concept in his 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f aesthetics.15 T hat is, such ju d g m en ts act as if they were 
d irec ted  at objects, b u t those objects are never analyzable for Kant entirely 
in  in trinsic term s, an d  becom e im portan t solely for w hat they p roduce in 
th e ir  b e h o ld e r . O r as a n o th e r  s tu d en t o f the Critique of Judgment, J o h n  
Z am m ito  pu ts it, »W hile K ant stresses the degree to which the subject is 
affected ( afficiert) in the experience, nevertheless it is striking how n o t merely 
th e  o b jec t b u t even th e  re p re se n ta tio n  o f the o b jec t shifts far in to  the 
background . Its form  serves as the occasion, becom es at m ost a catalyst, for 
a com plex  subjective response .«1”
It is o ften  argued , as we have seen, tha t the na tu re  o f that response is 
in h eren tly  contem plative, passive and  spectatorial, d istancing the self from
14 See, for example, Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston, 
1960); George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca, 1974); Mary A. McClosky, K ant’s 
Aesthetics (London, 1987). There were many other issues in the long-running debate 
between Stolnitz and Dickie. For a useful overview, see PeterJ. McCormick, Modernity, 
Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 147-157.
15 Eva Schaper, Studies in K ant’s Aesthetics (Edinburgh, 1979), chapter 6. The concept of 
»as-if« is, of course, taken from Hans Vaihinger, but Schaper wants to restrict it to 
aesthetic judgments, not to the cognitive ones discussed in Kant’s first Critique.
"'John H. Zammito, The Genesis o f Kant’s Critique ofJudgment (Chicago, 1992), p. 113.
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the world and  our appetite to possess o r consum e it. A lthough this prim arily  
visual characterization may seem an od d  way to describe ways in w hich som e 
art can seize us and  invade o u r in terio rity  — an ex p e rien ce  p e rh ap s  m ost 
obviously u n d erg o n e  in aural term s w hen listen ing  to m usic — even h e re  
the subject may no t always be actively and  productively engaged in intervening 
in the world. Attentive listening, as Jam es Jo h n so n  has recently  show n,17 was 
an  ac q u ired  skill in  th e  18th cen tu ry  b ased  o n  th e  su p p re ss io n  o f  th e  
kinesthetic body and the concentration o f faculties on  only one sensory input. 
T he experience o f passive listening was carefully segregated  from  th a t o f  
dancing o r com m unal singing as the ea r was educated  to have contem plative 
aesthetic experiences. T he public co n cert hall w orked like the m useum  to 
deracinate works that had  their origins in the church  o r aristocratic cham ber, 
turning them  into what 19th-century aestheticians like E duard H anslick would 
call »absolute music.« In  literature as well, the h ab it o f  looking  fo r actual 
personal references in concocted narratives h ad  to be lost and  w hat C athe­
rine G allagher has called »nobody’s story,« the  realization  o f  acknow led- 
gedfictionality, p u t in its place before the novel cou ld  com e in to  its ow n.18
T here is, in  short, no  practical o r possessive in ten tio n  realized  in the 
act of listening, read ing  o r b eho ld ing  q u a  aesthetic experience . W e may, to 
be sure, also want to own the object for its value in the m arketplace o r because 
o f ou r passion to collect, b u t this is n o t th e  sam e as a p u re ly  ae s th e tic  
response. T he possibility of that experience may be situated in an institutional 
context o r cultural field, as philosophers like G eorge Dickie an d  sociologists 
like P ierre  B ourd ieu  have a rg u ed ,19 b u t the  ex p e rien ce  itself c a n n o t be 
reduced  to a m ere reflex o f that enab lin g  contex t. F or it entails precisely 
the distance from  extrinsic functionality  th a t such reduction ism  wishes to 
im pose on it from  without. It is for this reason  th a t H aberm as can  claim  in 
The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity th a t  » the  p ro b le m  o f  g ro u n d in g  
m odernity o u t of itself first comes in to  consciousness in the realm  o f aesthetic 
criticism.«20
17 James H. Johnson, Listening in Paris: A Cultural History (Berkeley, 1995).
18 Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Woman Writers in the Marketplace, 
1670-1820 (Berkeley, 1994).
19 George Dickie, Aesthetics (Indianapolis, 1971); and Pierre Bourdieu, TheField of Cultural 
Production: Essays on Art and Literature, ed., Randal Johnson (New York, 1993). For a 
critique of Dickie, see Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking 
Art (Cambridge, Mass, 1990, pp. 38-41. For a critique of Bourdieu, see Paul Crowther, 
»Sociological Imperialism and the Field of Cultural Production: The Case of 
Bourdieu,« Theory, Culture and Society, 11,1 (1994).
20 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1987), p. 10.
72
Drifting into Dangerous Waters
This is no t, to be  sure, to deny th a t the boundaries o f aesthetic expe­
rience  them selves may n o t be  entirely im perm eable. R ecent scholarship has 
stressed how  the  th ird  Critique itself struggled to find a way to bridge the 
gap between cognitive and  m oraljudgm ents and their aesthetic counterpart.21 
T h e  la rger p ro jec t o f  the  th ird  Critique was, after all, to explore the ways in 
which na tu re  could  be understood  teleologically ra ther than mechanistically, 
thus going beyond the rigid lim itations on  knowledge set by the first Critique. 
T h e  pu rp o siv en ess in a r t  cou ld  thus be fo u n d  in n a tu re  as well, which 
suggested  a possible reun ification  of the  varieties of reason. »Beauty,« Kant 
also w en t on  to  claim , cou ld  be understood  as »the symbol o f morality,«22 
because o f its em phasis on  purposiveness w ithout extrinsic purposes, which 
was parallel to the m oral ideal o f treating every person as an end itself implied 
by the categorical im perative. A lthough the link between art and ethics could 
n o t be estab lished  discursively, drawing on  rational argum ents, it could be 
suggested  sym bolically an d  analogically. In bo th  cases, the self-reflective 
subject h ad  to achieve a certa in  distance to allow judgm en t to occur. Even 
m o re  decisively, th a t d im en sio n  o f aesthetic  ex p e rien ce  K ant followed 
L onginus in calling »the sublime« provided a link with the noum enal origins 
o f practical reason , because it got us in touch with supersensible realities 
th a t cou ld  n o t be grasped  by synthetic a p rio rijudgm en ts, help ing  p roduce 
a fe e lin g  o f  re s p e c t fo r th e  m ora l law th a t was also  beyond  cognitive 
u n d ers tan d in g . H ere  the objective correlate to our feelings is even m ore 
rem o te  th an  it is in the  case o f the beautiful, as the paradoxical a ttem pt to 
re p resen t the  u n rep resen tab le  is the essence o f the sublim e, which registers 
bo th  the  g ra n d eu r and  the  futility o f the quest.
How successful K ant’s Critique of Judgment actually was in rein tegrating  
w hat his earlier work h ad  seem ed so powerfully to split asunder is, o f course, 
a m atter o f som e dispute; the  en tire  subsequent history o f G erm an Idealism 
suggests th a t a t least his im m ed ia te  successors th o u g h t it was a failure. 
B eginning  as early as S ch ille r’s Letters on Aesthetic Education, they sought to 
reu n ite  a r t with the o th e r spheres in the hope of reenchan ting  life, a project 
th a t co n tin u ed  well in to  the  20th century  with no t m uch success to show for 
it. I t  has o ften  b een  rem ark ed  th a t when K ant’s ideas were vulgarized in the 
19th century, as they were by certain  French philosophers like Victor Cousin, 
they  co u ld  easily be taken  to  co u n ten an ce  the  opposite  conclusion, the 
ex trem e aesthe tic  separatism  th a t becam e the m ark o f the Vart pour l ’art
21 See in particular, Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique ofJudgment in which he discusses 
what he calls the »cognitive and ethical turn« in the third Critique.
22 This was the title of §59 of the third Critique.
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m ovem ent.23 W ith S ch o p en h a u e r’s 1818 World as Will and Representation, 
aesthetic  ex p e rien ce  was re d u ced  to th e  a ttitu d e  o f  n o n -p rac tica l c o n ­
tem plation, a way to fend  off, a t least tem porarily , the  m eaninglessness o f 
the world.24 Perhaps one o f the reasons fo r this ou tcom e was the  difficulty 
o f reconciling the disinterestedness o f aesthetic experience -  now understood  
w ithout the public, communicative m o m en t Kant had  a ttribu ted  to it25 -  widi 
the in terested  qualities o f bo th  its cognitive an d  m oral co u n terp arts . In  the 
case of the form er, it was impossible to suspend for very long  o u r in te re sted  
involvement with the world, which gratified o r frustrated  o u r corporeal needs 
and  desires. In  the  case o f the latter, real objects o r a t least o th e r  h u m an  
beings were necessary to test o u r will to act m orally an d  be involved in the 
world o f practical consequences. As Paul C row ther has n o ted , »for K ant the 
bu rden  o f em phasis in m oral existence falls on  obstacles and  responsibilities 
in relation to the expression of freedom . In aesthetic experience it does not.... 
H ence, whilst the pu re  aesthetic ju d g m en t m igh t figure in a m oral im age o f 
the world, it could ju s t as easily, if n o t m o re  so, incline  us to  a  life o f  self- 
indu lgen t o r in d o len t contem plation , w herein  the dem ands o f m oral duty 
were the least of our preoccupations.«20 T h ere  was, in  o th e r words, a certa in  
tension betw een  the aristocratic  le isurely  prem ises o f  a e s th e tic  d is in te ­
restedness — the ability to see a beautifu l landscape w here peasants toiling 
in the fields could only see recalcitran t soil -  and  the  m oral im perative to 
trea t everyone as an end  in h im /o r  herself.
But w hether or n o t a successful re in teg ra tio n  o f the th ree  spheres was 
achieved by Kant o r anyone else, the tacit uncoup ling  o f aesthetic experience 
from  the a rt object within the sphere o f  the  aesthetic allow ed a p rob lem atic  
slippage between spheres that is the real subject o f  this paper. Schem atically 
put, there were two im plications th a t could  be draw n from  the w ithdraw al 
o f  em p h as is  on  b ea u ty  in  th e  o b je c t  i ts e lf  in  fav o r o f  su b jec tiv e  o r
23 Seejohn Wilcox, »The Beginnings of Гart pour Гart,« Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
11 (June, 1953), and Gene H. Bell-Villada, Art for Art's Sale and Literary Life: How Politics 
and Markets Helped Shape the Ideology and Culture of Aestheticism, 1790-1990 (Lincoln, Neb.,
1996).
24 For an account of the debates concerning the reduction of experience to attitude 
initiated by Schopenhauer, see Bohdan Dziemidok, »Controversy about Aesthetic 
Attitude: Does Aesthetic Attitude Condition Aesthetic Experience?,« in Michael H. 
Mitias, ed., Possibility of Aesthetic Experience (Amsterdam, 1986).
25 According to Jauss, »as the new ideal of aesthetic pleasure, self-enjoying subjectivity 
abandoned the sensus communis as the expression of a sociable sympathy at the same 
moment the aesthetics of genius finally replaced the aesthetics of rhetoric.« Aesthetic 
Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 26.
26 Paul Crowther, »The Significance of Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgment,« British Journal 
of Aesthetics, 36, 2 (April, 1996), p. 118.
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in tersubjective response. O ne , to which we have already alluded, was the 
progressive o b lite ra tio n  o f  the  object, which paralleled  the disappearance 
o f the thing-in-itself in post-Kan tian epistemology. N ot only was the real world 
re fe re n t o f the  artw ork b racketed  in the service of p u re  fictionality, so too 
the materiality o f  the representation itself was often suppressed and forgotten. 
T h e  seco n d  a n d  seem ingly  opposite  im plication  was the  ind iscrim inate 
elevation o f all objects in to  poten tial works of art, depend ing  on the attitude 
o f th e ir beho lder. In e ith e r case, the specificity o f the work o f art as such 
was u n d e rm in e d . L et m e take each tendency  in  tu rn . T echnolog ies o f 
sim ulacral m echan ical rep ro d u c tio n  like photography and  the cinem a may 
have a b e tte d  th e  f irs t o u tc o m e , lead in g  to w hat has b ee n  ca lled  the  
»im m aterialization o f reality,«27 bu t it was already foreshadowed, I want to 
argue, in the privileging of disinterestedness in aesthetic theory. For an object 
that was p roh ib ited  from  soliciting any desire or interest, an  object that could 
n ev e r be  possessed  o r  co n su m ed , was an  o b jec t th a t  w ould u ltim ate ly  
sq u an d e r its pow er to engage the  very corporeal response tha t aisthesis had  
so u g h t to  ex p lo re . F u r th e r  e ro sio n  fo llow ed from  th e  leveling o f the 
d istinction betw een works o f a rt and their critical reception, a tendency that 
cu lm in ated  in  d eco n stru c tio n ’s pan-textualist b reaching  of the boundary 
betw een ergon  an d  p a re rg o n  (work and  fram e). By 1981, the literary critic 
M urray K rieger cou ld  loudly lam ent in a work called Arts on the Level the 
» o b lite ra tio n  o f  th e  rea lm  o f art, its objects, its m useum s...every th ing  
im m ersed  w ithin the  indivisible flood o f experience.«28
In  the visual arts, the sam e alarm  bell was sounded  a few years earlier 
in M ichael F ried’s celebrated and  controversial essay »Art and  Objecthood.«2<J 
A ccording to Fried, the specificity o f pictures as such was being  underm ined  
by a new literalness, which foregrounded the anti-illusionist, material support 
o f the flat canvas, an d  a style o f beholding he called »theatrical,« By the latter, 
h e  m ean t an  ind ifference to the specific m edia o f the  separate arts and  a 
willingness to privilege the experience o f the beholder over time ra ther than 
the  a r t ob ject itself. T h e  o ften  cited exam ple he  gave o f the new sensibility 
was an  acco u n t given by the artist Tony Smith o f a car ride he had  taken on 
the N ew jersey  tu rnp ike, in which he realized that traditional art was dead. 
In  F ried ’s gloss, the  resu lt was th a t »the experience alone is what m atters.«30
27 Paul Crowther, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Oxford, 1993), p. 18. See also Arthur
Danto, The State of the Art (New York, 1987).
28 Murray Krieger, Arts on the Level: The Fall of the Elite Object (Knoxville, Tenn., 1981), p. 56.
20 Originally published in 1967, it is included with other essays of that period and a long
introduction answering subsequent criticism in Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and
Review (Chicago, 1998).
30 Ibid., p. 158.
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Fried’s fierce resistance to this tren d  was n o t very successful, as h e  w ould be 
the first to adm it. If  postm odern ism  has m ean t anyth ing , it has m ean t a 
fu rther erosion  o f the integrity o f the work o f art.
W hen the  M inimalist art Fried b em o an ed  was jo in e d  by an  even less 
pictorial C oncep tua l Art, the rad ical p o ten tia l o f leveling was still m o re  
powerfully realized. Artists like Joseph  Kossuth o r M ichael A sher ab an d o n ed  
the m ateriality o f the work entirely in favor o f  a tex tual su rrogate  (with only 
a residue o f the acknow ledgm ent th a t in scribed  texts can  them selves be  
tre a ted  as m ate ria l ob jects). M arcel D u c h a m p ’s read y m ad es, in  w hich  
random  objects from  everyday life ra th e r  th an  ones d es ig n ed  by artistic  
in ten tion  and  fashioned by artistic ta len t were im b u ed  with artistic value by 
the fiat o f the artist, was a way-station to this end . D u ch am p ’s fam ous visual 
indifference, his disdain for m ere »retinal« p leasure, m ean t th a t n o t only 
the art ob ject was being  obliterated , b u t so too was the  sensual d im ension  
o f aesthetic experience, which becam e a m ore cerebral, theoretically  driven 
game like the chess he began playing seriously in the 1920's as an  alternative 
to p roducing  -  o r ra th e r designating -  even readym ade works o f  art. H ere , 
ironically, the  end  o f aesthetics tu rn ed  o u t to be  a k ind  o f anaesthesia  in 
which n o t only the object stim ulating the  senses h ad  vanished, b u t so too 
w ere the  senses it was supposed  to  effect. H e g e l’s n o to rio u s  claim  th a t 
philosophy w ould and  should replace a r t seem ed  fulfilled by this ou tcom e.
D uch am p ’s elevation o f urinals, snow shovels a n d  b o ttle  racks in to  
objects worthy o f being  included  in  the sacred space o f the m useum  was, 
however, m ore than a parodie gesture m ocking the pretensions o f  a rt objects 
to possess in h e re n t qualities o f beauty, m ore  th an  a den ia l o f  the p leasure 
o f the gaze, m ore th an  a victory o f  th e  co n c ep t over the  im age. F rom  a 
different angle, it exemplifies the second m ain im plication tha t could  be  and  
was drawn from the privileging of aesthetic experience over art objects, which 
involved the drifting I have invoked in my dde. T hat is, ra ther than  debunking  
a rt by b rin g in g  it down to the level o f  o rd in ary  life, using , as D u ch am p  
provocatively recom m ended, »The M ona Lisa« as an iron ing  board , it could  
seek to elevate life by bringing  it u p  to the  putative level o f  art. In  o th e r 
words, it could prom ote the prom iscuous reen ch an tm en t o f the en tire  world, 
the »transfiguration o f the com m onplace,«31 as if any object o r event, however 
mean, were a legitimate occasion for aesthetic experience. As Jauss has noted, 
»aesthetic experience does n o t seem  to develop ‘organically ,’ on  a field o f  
its own, b u t to progressively expand  an d  m ain ta in  its area  o f  m ean in g  a t the 
expense o f b o rdering  experiences o f reality, an d  this by usu rpa tions an d
31 Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1981).
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c o m p e n s a tio n s , th e  c ro ss in g  o f  b o u n d a r ie s , th e  o ffe r  o f  c o m p e tin g  
solutions.«32 T h e  resu lt was a leveling up  ra th e r than down, a conflation of 
rep resen ta tion  with reference, a kind of im perialism  o f aesthetic sublimation 
in  w hich every ob ject cou ld  be redeem ed  in aesthetic terms.
D ucham p him self, to be sure, would have scoffed a t so lofty a program , 
b u t by low ering the th resh o ld  o f w hat could be construed  as an object o f 
a e s th e t ic  a p p r e c ia t io n  a n d  e n jo y m e n t (o r a t le a s t th e ir  c o n c e p tu a l 
c o u n te rp a r t) , h e  was draw ing on, if in som e ways also reversing the valence 
of, a venerab le trad ition  th a t began  as early as the Rom antics and  continues 
to o u r day. It cou ld  em erge only when the longstanding disdain for natu re  
as a realm  o f  fallen an d  debased  m atter in com parison with elevated spirit 
was reversed, a transfo rm ation  that was anticipated  by certain  he terodox  
philosophies like Spinoza’s pantheism  in the 17th century. It was also evident, 
if in slightly d isp laced  form  in social or cultural term s, in that increasing 
in co rp o ra tio n  o f form erly  »low« subject m atter in allegedly »high« art, the 
dem ocratization  o f c o n ten t evident in the genre paintings o f early m odern  
D utch art, the bourgeois, dom estic tragedies o f the Enlightenm ent, and most 
o f  all th e  rise  o f  th e  novel. I t was a p p a re n t  as w ell in  th e  R o m an tic  
in co rp o ra tio n  o f  the  fragm ent, the sketch, and  the incom plete o r ru ined  
torso in to  the can o n  o f  g en u in e  art. It cam e into its own with what M. H. 
Abram s has follow ed C arlyle’s Sartor Resartus in calling »natural superna­
tu ra lism ,« 33 th e  in fu sin g  o f  the  n a tu ra l w orld with all o f  the num inous 
m ean in g  th a t had  h ith e rto  b een  reserved for transcenden t spirit. Now the 
everyday, the com m onplace, could be understood  as glowing with im m anent 
significance, o r  least potentially possessing it through poetic transfiguration, 
w h ich  s o u g h t  to  fill th e  v acu u m  le ft by th e  w ith d raw al o f  re lig io u s  
sacralization.34
In  a re cen t work en titled  Into the Light o f Things, G eorge L eonard has 
traced w hat h e  calls the »art o f the com m onplace« from W ordsworth through 
Carlyle an d  Ruskin to J o h n  Cage, whose celebrated  com position »4'33«« 
im b u ed  even seem ingly unm usical silence o r m ore precisely, the am bient 
noise left when no notes were sounded, with aesthetic value.35 In visual terms,
32 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 111-112.
33 M.H. Abrams, Natural Supematuralism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(New York, 1971).
34 This impulse was later to be rechanneled into the quasi-political project of the avant- 
garde to imbue life with the energies of art, a project whose problematic implications 
have been foregrounded by Peter Bürger in Theory of the Avant Garde, trans. Michael 
Shaw (Minneapolis, 1984).




L eonard detects a sim ilar transition already taking place betw een the  tim e 
o f Sir J o s h u a  R eynolds an d  J o h n  C o n s ta b le . A lth o u g h  h e  n o te s  th a t 
W ordsw orth m ore  likely g o t his an ti-h ie ra rch ica l ideas a b o u t a e s th e tic  
experience from  the English critic A rchibald  A lison’s Essays on the Nature 
and Principles of Taste o f 1790 than  directly  from  K ant, w hose G erm an  h e  
could n o t read, the end  result was sim ilar. For Alison also a rg u ed  against 
elite a r t objects an d  in favor o f th e  subjective re ac tio n  we can  have to 
anything, however trivial or m undane. Even the sublim e, w hich h ad  been  
reserved for awesome and  unfa thom able experiences in the  18th century, 
could now b e  applied  to the com m onp lace , ju s t  as lo n g  as the  aesthe tic  
sensibility o f the beh o ld er was capable o f ap p rec ia tin g  it in this m an n er.
T h e re  was, to  be su re , an  im p o r ta n t  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e en  n a tu ra l  
supernatu ralism  an d  the K antian n o tio n  o f  aesth e tic  ex p e rien ce , w hich 
Leonard does no t rem ark. W hereas the fo rm er im plied  a pantheistic p ro jec t 
of reenchan ting  the world, som ehow im buing  it with a secularized religious 
m eaning, Kant had  explicitly decried  such a ttem pts in his own day. In  the 
famous »Pantheism  Controversy,« which divided G erm an intellectuals in the 
decade after F.H. Jaco b i’s 1785 attack o n  Lessing’s su p p o sed  em b race  o f  
Spinozist atheism , h e  was a fervent critic o f  the  ra tio n a lis t im m anen tism  
im plied  in  the G reek  slogan hen kai pan  ( th e  o n e  is th e  all) revived by 
Lessing.30 Kant vigorously resisted what h e  saw as dre determ inist im plications 
o f tha t position, which u n d erm in ed  the possibility o f h u m an  freed o m  an d  
m ade practical reaso n ’s exercise o f will m eaningless. H e thus never w ent as 
far as the natu ral supernaturalists in reinvesting th e  w orld with any k ind  o f 
aesthetic cum  religious »real presence,«37 preserving instead a m ore o rthodox  
believer’s faith in a transcenden t God.
But w hat K ant’s stress on the d isin terestedness o f  aesthetic  ex p e rien ce  
d id  allow , even if  u n in te n tio n a lly , was th e  p o ssib ility  o f  h av in g  su ch  
experiences in the face o f objects o r events o r actions th a t h ad  n o t b een  
in tended  as works of art o r deliberately created  to provide aesthetic pleasure. 
In fact, he h im self distinctly p re fe rred  n a tu ra l to artifical beauty, the  real 
th ing to m an-m ade representations. For this reason , h e  cou ld  b e  co n stru ed  
as an  u n w ittin g  p re c u rso r  o f  n a tu ra l  s u p e rn a tu ra lism . In so fa r  as th is 
implication was a necessary accom panim ent o f the redefin ition  o f previously
36 For a good account of Kant’s role in the debate, see Zammito, The Genesis of the Third 
Critique, chapters 11 and 12.
37 The urge to do this is still alive, as evidenced by George Steiner’s recent book, Real 
Presences (Chicago, 1989), which, to be sure, tries to see art from the point of view of 
the creator rather than the beholder or critic, and in so doing, stress its links with 
freedom.
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sacred  o r o rn am en ta l objects as purely artistic ones, it p roduced  a valuable 
disarticulation o f the in h e re n t logic o f the aesthetic sphere from its cognitive 
an d  m oral co u n terp arts . T he sam e m ight be said of the later réévaluation 
o f ritual o r  u tilitarian  objects from  so-called prim itive cultures as objects o f 
form al beauty, w hich took place du rin g  the m odern ist era. H ere too the 
extension o f aesthetic appreciation to cultural artifacts that had hitherto  been 
dism issed as m ere  exam ples o f  less advanced peoples can be accoun ted  an 
ad v an ce  in  co sm o p o lita n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  (how ever p ro b le m a tic  such  
d eco n tex tu a liza tio n  m ay seem  to defenders o f  the integrity  o f individual 
cu ltu re s) .
But w hen carried  to an indiscrim inate extrem e, such an extension could 
lead  to a prom iscuous aestheticization o f the entire world, reducing  it to a 
m ere  occasion fo r d isin terested  subjective pleasure. All objects or events, 
w h e th e r o r n o t they were ever in ten d ed  as works o f art, could be redeem ed  
in aesthetic  term s, if they p ro d u ced  an experience that som ehow  m easured 
up  to whatever the com m on sense o f the time called aesthetic. As Jauss notes, 
»the aesthetic  experience  o f ro le  distance can be intensified and  becom e 
aestheticism  w hen it is taken up  in a real-life situation w here the conventions 
o f m orality o r tact d em and  a wholly serious involvement. W hen, for example, 
a w ork such as the Isenheim  altar is perceived and in te rp re ted  solely as a 
ca rrie r o f  aesthetic  qualities and  abstraction is m ade from  everything that 
m akes the rep resen ta tio n  o f the m artyrdom  shocking, cruel, and  thereby 
exem plary, it is n o t only a devout sensibility tha t will be offended. Such an 
a t t i tu d e  is a lso  in a p p ro p r ia te  to th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  o b jec t itse lf  
dem ands.«38
P erhaps the  m ost tro u b lin g  im plications o f this ind ifference to the 
qualities o f the ob ject were evident in what W alter Benjam in famously called 
the »aestheticization o f politics.« This is no t the place to launch a full-fledged 
rehearsa l o f its d ivergen t im plications, a task I have a ttem p ted  elsew here,39 
b u t several points should be m ade. Benjam in’s critique was directed explicitly 
at w hat he saw as fascist aestheticized politics, in which hum an suffering could 
becom e an occasion for aesthetic delectation. Most clearly evident in the 
ce leb ra tion  o f war as a spectacle in the work o f Futurists like M arinetti, it 
also ap p eared  in his own day in the threnodies to apocalyptic violence in 
E rnst J ü n g e r ’s techno log ica l sublim e. Perhaps the m ost frequently  cited 
ex p ressio n  o f  this a ttitu d e  was the rem ark  m ade by the  Symbolist p o e t 
L au ren t T ailhade in  reaction  to  a deadly anarchist bom b thrown in to  the
38 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 6.
30 M artinjay, »The Aesthetic Ideology as Ideology: Or What Does It Mean to Aestheticize 
Politics,« Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York, 1993).
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French C ham ber o f Deputies in the 1890's: »N’im porte  les victimes, si le geste 
est beau.« H ere  contem plative d isin te rested n ess was given an  especially  
sinister twist because the object to be »enjoyed« was the destruction o f h u m an  
life. T he rigid distinction between aesthetic and  ethical values, which derived 
m uch o f its im petus from  a reductive m isread ing  o f K an t’s th ird  Critique, 
com bined  with the uncoupling  o f aesthetic experience from  works o f  art, to 
c o u n te n a n c e  w hat in  o th e r  sp h e re s  w o u ld  b e  qu ick ly  u n d e r s to o d  as 
problem atic. T hat is, in the realm  o f  cognition , ep istem ological ju d g m en ts  
about objects that do n o t exist are norm ally called hallucinations o r fantasies, 
and  are separa ted  from  those th a t can  claim  som e w a rran t in  th e  w orld 
external to the self. If ethical ju d g m en ts  are app lied  to behav ior o r events 
th a t have n o t occurred  o r tha t did  n o t involve th e  exercise o f h u m an  will, 
we worry abou t o u r inappropria tely  m oralizing w hat shou ld  be  u n d ers to o d  
in different terms. The same caudon, it would seem, should  apply with regard  
to aesthetic experience, when it seeks its d e tach ed  p leasure anyw here it can 
find it. However m uch  we may app laud  the  dem ocratic  expansion  o f  the 
realm  o f art objects beyond the limits o f th e ir elite p redecessors, how ever 
m uch we may recognize the value o f lea rn in g  to salvage objects th a t have 
lost th e ir initial functional p u rpose  in  aesthe tic  term s, it m ay b e  wise to 
acknowledge limits to how far the aesthetic re en ch a n tm e n t o f the w orld can 
go. T he natu ra l supernatu ra list p ro ject, like all p an th e is t affirm ations o f 
im m anence, com es u p  against the radical evil th a t exists in  the w orld th a t it 
tries to valorize. A lthough violence can be aesthetically  tran sfig u red  an d  
rep resen ted  in works o f art -  how else cou ld  we read  with ad m ira tio n  The 
Illiad o r s tand  com fortably before Picasso’s Guernica?40 -  w hen the fram e is 
broken , represen ta tion  is confused with re ference, an d  u n m ed ia ted  reality 
becom es fair game for aestheticization, the effect is very d ifferent. A esthetic 
experience, in short, cannot be entirely freed  from  a consideration  o f which 
objects and  events m ayjustifiable evoke it, o r  else it courts the charge th a t 
it produces a theodicy o f beauty, which is no  less problem atic  th an  its ethical 
counterpart.
O r ra ther, it can n o t avoid tha t rebuke if we rem ain  w ithin the  term s 
set by the 18th-century’s version of that experience. But w hat if an o th er no tion  
o f aesthetic experience could be d efen d ed  th a t w ould avoid the  privileging 
o f subject over ob ject and  thus avoid th e  d an g ers  o f d rifting? O n e  such
40 Kant himself makes this point when he notes that at least in one respect man-made art 
is superior to natural beauty: »Where fine art evidences its superiority is in the beautiful 
description of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, 
devastations of war, and the like, can (as evils) be very beautifully described, nay even 
represented in pictures.« Critique of Judgment, §48, 5:321.
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a lte rn a tiv e  was, in  fact, p re s e n te d  in  J o h n  Dewey’s w ell-know n Art as 
Experience, w h ich  h as  re c e n tly  b e e n  rev ived  in  th e  w ork o f  R ic h a rd  
S husterm an , in particu la r his Pragmatic Aesthetics of 1992.41 Dewey’s ire was 
d irec ted  at all aspects o f w hat h e  took to be the Kantian version o f aesthetic 
experience , w hich he  d en o u n ced  as the fruit o f excessive E n ligh tenm en t 
rationalism  with its com partm entaliz ing  m ania for categorical distinctions. 
Against th e  isolation o f aesthetic experience from o ther variants, h e  argued  
for their ultim ate integration in an ongoing, participatory interaction between 
hum ans and  their environm ent. Against the passive and contem plative notion 
o f aesthetic  experience , he  a rgued  for an  active, practical and  productive 
alternative, which w ould overcom e the gap between artistic creativity and 
aesthetic recep tion . A gainst the tacit elevation o f the visual arts th rough  the 
sp ec ta to ria l bias o f trad itio n a l aesthetic  theory, he stressed the  n ee d  to 
involve the en tire  sensorium . Against the privileging of disinterestedness and 
psychological de tach m en t as foundations o f the aesthetic attitude, he argued 
th a t desire an d  in te re st w ere as in tegral a p art o f our sensual encoun ters 
with a r t as with the rest o f  the  world.
But m ost im p o rtan t for o u r purposes, against the evisceration o f the 
ob ject in the  nam e o f subjective or intersubjective response, h e  rallied  to 
the defense o f the artw ork n o t entirely for itself as an exem plar o f a P latonic 
notion  o f beauty, b u t as an integral dim ension of aesthetic experience, rightly 
u n d ers to o d . T h e  ex trem e separation  of organism  from  world, h e  argued, 
»lies b eh ind  the idea that esthetic quality does no t belong to objects as objects 
b u t is pro jected  onto  them  by m ind. It is the source o f the definition o f beauty 
as ‘objectified  p leasu re ’ in stead  of as p leasure in the object, so m uch  in  it 
th a t the ob ject and  p leasure are one and  undivided in the experience.«42 
»T here can be no  esthetic experience,« he argued, »apart from  an object, 
and  th a t for an  object to be the con ten t of esthetic appreciation it m ust satisfy 
th o se  objective c o n d i t io n s  w ith o u t w h ich  c u m u la tio n , c o n se rv a tio n , 
reenforcem ent, transition in to  som ething m ore com plete, are impossible.«43
41 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1934); Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics. See 
also Shusterman, PracticisingPhilosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York,
1997), and »The End of Aesthetic Experience,« and his exchange with Alexander 
Nehamas in TheJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56,1 (1998).
42 Dewey, Art and Experience, p. 248. It is passages like this that allow Shusterman to argue 
that ultimately Dewey privileges »dynamic aesthetic experience over the fixed material 
object which our conventional thinking identifies -  and then commodifies and 
fetishizes -  as the work of art....art gets defined as ‘a quality of experience’ rather than 
a collection of objects or a substantive essence shared only by such objects...« 
(Pragmatist Aesthetics, p. 25).
43 Ibid., p. 146-147.
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W hereas a prelim inary distinction betw een self an d  w orld m ay be ju s tif ied  
in certain  o th er areas o f endeavor, such as n a tu ra l science, »the un iquely  
d istinguishing feature o f esthetic ex perience is exactly the  fact th a t n o  such 
distinction o f self an d  object exists in  it, since it is esthetic  to the d eg ree  in 
which organism  and  env ironm ent co o p era te  to in stitu te  an  ex p e rien ce  in 
which the two are so fully in tegra ted  th a t each  disappears.«44
Such a d isappearance does not, however, b e to k en  the  sam e th in g  th a t 
is im plied by the loss of the referential ob ject in 18th-century aesthetic theory 
o r the re lig ious/cum  aesthetic re e n ch a n tm e n t o f  the w orld in the  n a tu ra l 
s u p e rn a tu ra l  tra d itio n . F o r a lth o u g h  D ew ey h o p e d  fo r  th e  u l t im a te  
reconciliation of life and art, he also recognized tha t it had  n o t yet h appened . 
T herefore, the artwork as object set ap a rt from  subject rep resen ted  a  covert 
p ro test against the unfulfilled  po ten tia l fo r in teg ra ted  ex p e rien ce  in  the  
m o d ern  world. T he possibility for g en u in e  ex p e rien ce  in th a t w orld , he  
paralleled  Benjam in and  A dorno in lam enting , was severely lim ited: »Zeal 
fo r doing, lust for action, leaves m any a person , especially in this h u rr ie d  
and  im patien t hum an  env ironm ent in w hich we live, with ex p erien ce  o f  an 
alm ost incredible paucity, all on the surface. No one experience has a chance 
to com plete itself because som ething else is en te red  u p o n  so speedily. W hat 
is called experience becom es so d ispersed  an d  m iscellaneous as hard ly  to 
deserve the  nam e.«45 T h e  work o f a rt, as Dewey d esc rib ed  it, p ro v id ed  a 
prom ise o f the o rder, com pleteness an d  in teg ra tio n  o f ex p erien ce  th a t was 
missing in everyday life and that was wrongly p ro jec ted  o n to  the w orld in its 
p resen t state.
This argum ent, which will be fam iliar in certain  respects to those m ade 
by the Frankfurt School, must, however, be  set against the relatively optim istic 
expectations of the pragm atist tradition, in which fulfilled experience is now 
a possibility, despite obstacles that m ay prevail in the  ex ternal w orld. Dewey 
may perhaps have been  a b it too quick to  dissolve the  d istinction  betw een 
eso teric  fine art, the a r t  o f  m useum s a n d  c o n c e r t  halls, from  life lived 
aesthetically. As Shusterm an has conceded , for Dewey aesthetic  ex p e rien ce  
»could be achieved in virtually any dom ain  o f  action , since all ex p erien ce , 
to be co h e ren t and  m eaningful, req u ired  the germ  o f aesthetic un ity  and  
developm ent. By re th in k in g  a rt in term s o f aesthe tic  ex p e rien ce , Dewey 
h o p e d  we cou ld  radically  en la rg e  an d  d em o cra tize  th e  d o m a in  o f  a rt, 
in tegrating it m ore fully into the real world which w ould be greatly im proved 
by the  p u rsu it o f such m an ifo ld  arts o f  living.«40 As a resu lt, d esp ite  its
44 Ibid., p. 249.
45 Ibid., p. 45.
4li Shusterman, »The End of Aesthetic Experience,« p. 33.
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lau d ab le  in te n tio n  to red ress the balance lost by K antian aesthetics, the 
p ragm atist a ttem p t to fashion a new no tion  of experience, including bo th  
subject and  ob ject in an  equiprim ordial in teraction, may too easily p roduce 
th e  sam e o u tco m e  as th a t o f the n a tu ra l su p e rn a tu ra lis t trad ition : the 
ind iscrim inate  leveling o f the  distinction between a rt work and  life world 
th ro u g h  p ro jec ting  the  qualities o f  the form er onto  the latter.47
T o  avo id  su ch  an  o u tc o m e , a c e r ta in  re sp e c t fo r the  c o n tin u e d  
d is t in c tio n  b e tw een  th e  two m ay be re q u ire d , a t lea s t as lo n g  as th e  
re in teg ra tio n  rem ains m ore a desideratum  than a real possibility. Such a 
distinction would involve acknowledging that works of art, although inevitably 
in te n d e d  to  p ro d u c e  aesth e tic  ex p erien ce  in their beho lders , som ehow  
exceed  th a t ou tcom e. To h o n o r this difference does n o t m ean fetishizing 
the elite object o r ascetically denigrating any pleasure in the present, as some 
d efen d ers  o f aesthetic  experience fear.48 It entails instead a recognition  of 
the fruitful constellation  th a t keeps subjects and  objects irreducible to each 
o th er, even as they ca n n o t be understood  in isolation. As form ed m aterial 
objects -  a charac teriza tion  m ore self-evidently true for certain  kinds o f art 
than  others, b u t arguably the case for all -  artworks resist reduction to nodiing 
b u t the form-giving o r form -appreciadng qualities o f the creative or receptive 
subject. In  this sense, they preserve the otherness of the n onhum an  world 
th a t shou ld  n o t be  m ade in to  a m ere occasion for aesthetic delectation  as 
exem plars o f  n a tu ra l beauty.
As specifically art objects, they resist leveling -  e ither up  or down -  with 
o th e r objects in o u r env ironm en t.4'1 T he necessarily illusory quality o f works
47 Although appreciating many aspects of Dewey’s approach, Jauss notes that he »assigns 
the traditional predicates of the beautiful in art to natural phenomena or those 
belonging to the world of objects. In other words, he projects them onto these 
phenom ena to then demonstrate that they are everyday ‘sources’ of aesthetic 
experience....The shortcoming in Dewey’s theory is...that it maintains the illusion of 
the objectively beautiful without tracing the aesthetic quality of the objects and 
phenomena of the everyday world back to the attitude of the observer.« Aesthetic 
Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 113.
48 This anxiety is evident in Jauss’s critique of Adorno as a champion of ascetic Platonism 
in Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics. For a different view, which shows the 
importance of experience in Adorno’s work, see Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Exact 
Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), chapter I. That 
the rigid separation of aesthetic from other kinds of pleasure in the Kantian tradition 
can itself be accused of asceticism from a Frankfurt School position is demonstrated 
in Robin May Schott, Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm (Boston, 
1988), chapter 11.
40 This is not the place to attempt a serious account of the differences between aesthetic 
and non-aesthetic objects. Perhaps the best known defense of the distinction from a
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o f a rt -  w hat G erm an aesthetics designates by the  w ord  Schein (a t o n ce  
sem blance and  appearance) -  sets them  categorically ap a rt from  the objects 
th a t we e n c o u n te r  cognitively o r m orally. T h e  p leasu re  they  p rov ide, if 
indeed  in all cases they can be said to p ro d u ce  p leasure, is n o t o f  the  sam e 
o rder as that provided by o th er objects th a t satisfy o u r desires an d  in terests.50 
T he ce lebrated  claim m ade by S ten d h al an d  re p e a te d  by N ietzsche an d  
M arcuse th a t art is »unepromesse de bonheur« m ust be u n d ers to o d  n o t only 
as a rebuke to the coldness o f the trad ition  o f d isin terested  d e tach m en t, b u t 
also as a recognition  tha t such happiness is n o t necessarily achievable in the 
present.
M oreover, as G eorge S te in er has n o te d , » the  o b jec ts  o f  sc ien tific  
speculation and investigation, however un certa in  th e ir rea lity-status outside 
the relevant hypothesis and  observation, are, nevertheless, given. T hey  are 
prior and determ inan t in ways which differ fundam entally  from  the  ‘com ing- 
in to -thereness’ o f the aesthetic....O nly in  the  aesthetic  is th e re  the  absolute 
freedom  ‘n o t to have com e into b e in g .’ Paradoxically, it is th a t possibility o f 
absence w hich gives au to n o m o u s fo rce  to  th e  p re sen ce  o f  th e  w ork.«51 
However m uch we may adm ire a su n se t fo r its beau ty  o r  be  awed by the 
sublime chaos of a batde, the experience we have o f works created  by h u m an  
intentionality can never forget their u n ique status in this regard. Even if such 
works can no  longer be understood  as perfectly fo rm ed , organic w holes, an 
assum ption tha t was laid to rest with M odernism  (an d  an tic ip a ted  by the  
R om antic cult o f  the fragm ent), they nonetheless still possess som e residue, 
perhaps solely in negative terms, o f the u top ian  im plications o f th a t im pulse.52
phenomenological perspective was mounted by Roman Ingarden, whose work is 
discussed in B. Dziemido and P. McCormick, eds. On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden 
(Boston, 1989). For a recent extension of his argument, see McCormick, Modernity, 
Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art. See also the different approaches in the books by 
Goodman and Genette cited in notes 1 and 2.
50 For a recent debate over the role of pleasure in aesthetic experience, see Shusterman, 
»The End of Aesthetic Experience«; Alexander Nehamas, »Richard Shusterman on 
Pleasure and Aesthetic Experience, « Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56, 1 (1998) ; 
and Shusterman, »Interpretation, Pleasure, and Value in Aesthetic Experience,« in 
ibid.
51 Steiner, Real Presences, p. 154-155.
52 Krieger claims that »the dethroning of the aesthetic object and aesthetic value and 
the abolition of the aesthetic realm altogether destroy the closed sanctity of such 
objects as self-fulfilled, instead opening them anew to an immediate relationship to 
normal experience. With the theoretical disappearance of closure, which is now seen 
to have been a deceiving myth, all objects, their would-be fictional boundaries dissolved, 
flow freely into and our of normal experience, now that they are declared no more 
than a routine part of that experience.« Arts on the Level, p. 55. Such a complaint
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N o t u n t i l  th e  w o rld  is i tse lf  m ad e  by h u m an s  who can  fa sh io n  th e ir  
e n v iro n m e n t  to  re a liz e  su ch  an  o u tc o m e  -  a telos th a t  m ay well be  
u n a tta in ab le , an d  m ay even be itself a deeply problem atic goal -  can we 
fo rget the  victims an d  praise the beautiful gesture that led to th e ir dem ise. 
F or the  p resen t, it is wiser to  h o ld  on  to the irreducib le  constellation  of 
objects an d  the experiences they en g en d er tha t prevent us from  collapsing 
on e  varian t o f ex p e rien ce  in to  ano ther. However porous the boundaries 
may be, how ever g rea t the yearning for a fully in tegrated  form  o f life, the 
d iffe ren tiations o f m odern ity  -  no t only am ong value spheres, b u t within 
them  as well -  may have a validity that we sacrifice at o u r peril.
overestimates the necessity of absolute closure and boundaried immanence in works 
of art, which ignores the importance of what Genette has called their transcendent 
potential. See his The Work of Art.

